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THE METAPHYSICAL PROBLEM OF 
INTERMITTENT EXISTENCE AND 
THE POSSIBILITY OF RESURRECTION 
David B. Hershenov 
Peter van Inwagen claims that if God were to reassemble the scattered 
atoms of a destroyed human being, the resulting organism would not be the 
individual that had died, but a duplicate. This view is challenged and an 
argument is offered that resurrection after a period of nonexistence is not a 
metaphysically impossible state of affairs. Also provided is an explanation 
of why our fundamental mereological and biological principles are not vio-
lated if the resurrected acquire a physically fit body despite possessing a 
frail form before their death. These same principles are compatible with a 
solution to the worrisome problem that many of a dying human being's 
molecules once were (or will be) in someone else at the time of the latter's 
death. The proper account of part replacement would permit both individu-
als to eventually be resurrected and to coexist for eternity. 
If one does not possess an immaterial and immortal soul, then the prospect 
of conscious experience after death would appear to depend upon the 
metaphysical possibility of the resurrection of one's biological life. By "res-
urrection," I don't mean just the possibility that a dead but still existing 
and well preserved individual could be brought back to life. My contention 
is that the human organism can even cease to exist, perhaps as a result of 
cremation or extensive decay, and yet still can be brought back into exis-
tence at a later time. That is, the same organism can live again after a peri-
od of nonexistence. However, a number of philosophers, religious and sec-
ular, insist that once an individual ceases to exist he does so forever, 
regardless of whether God or a future technology reassembles his atoms. 
Their claim is that the resulting human being would be a duplicate, for 
intermittent existence is impossible - at least for living creatures. In the 
pages that follow, I aim to establish, not that the dead will be resurrected, 
but that some of the alleged barriers to such an event are dubious. My con-
tention is that resurrection after a period of nonexistence is not a metaphys-
ically impossible state of affairs. 
The purpose of the first and longest section of this paper is to challenge 
Peter van Inwagen's claim that were God to reassemble the scattered 
atoms of a destroyed individual, the resulting living being would not be 
the human being that had died but a duplicate of him. However, I do agree 
with van Inwagen that it would be metaphysically impossible for each of 
us to be resurrected as we were at the age of twenty if we die as senior citi-
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY 
Vol. 20 No.1 January 2003 
All rights reserved 
24 
INTERMmENT EXISTENCE AND RESURRECTION 25 
zens, say as infirm eighty year olds. But I do not believe that we are con-
demned forever to that frail form with which we must be resurrected. The 
second part of this paper aims to provide a plausible explanation of how it 
is possible for us to experience a resurrection and healthy afterlife without 
violating any of our fundamental mereological and biological convictions. 
This includes a response to the worrisome possibility that many of our 
molecules once were (or will be) in someone else at the time of the latter's 
death. But even if the parts we each shared with another were vital or 
numerous, this does not rule out the resurrection of either of us - although 
it does prevent our simultaneous resurrection. Nevertheless, the proper 
account of part replacement would permit us both to eventually be resur-
rected and to coexist for eternity. 
Part I 
Van Inwagen doubts that resurrection can occur where the dead human 
being has not been preserved in a condition nearly identical to that in which 
it took its last breath. Even God cannot reassemble the molecules of a cremat-
ed individual in a manner that will make the miraculously assembled person 
one and the same as the individual cremated. Van Inwagen, of course, 
acknowledges that it is within God's power to reassemble all the atoms of 
someone destroyed through cremation, explosion or ordinary graveyard 
decay. But he insists that the resulting being would be someone else - a 
duplicate of the man who died and not the dead person restored to life. 
Van Inwagen's religious beliefs and his materialism lead him to suggest 
that at the moment we die, God replaces the newly dead form with a simu-
lacrum and stores the preserved body somewhere for the resurrection. Since 
van Inwagen's account has God involved in 'body snatching," family mem-
bers actually bury or cremate illusions of loved ones and cannibals make vir-
tual rather than real meals out of explorers, missionaries and anthropolo-
gists. This seems so bizarre that even the staunchest materialist, if he has any 
religious leanings, may be tempted to give dualism another hearing. 
Why is God unable to resurrect a destroyed being whose parts have 
been scattered? Van Inwagen's reasoning is that God's gathering of scat-
tered human particles would mean that a miraculous force rather than the 
essential life processes of the organism are responsible for the location and 
organization of the constituent matter of the life. Van Inwagen insists that 
an organism at one time is identical to an organism at another time if there 
is the proper biological continuity linking the two. The organism's parts 
must be caught up in the same life processes and these life processes must 
be responsible for the role and position of the parts. Since such processes 
are absent from miraculous reassembly, this makes God's deed a duplica-
tion rather than a resurrection of the original life. 
Van Inwagen illustrates his claim with the analogy of an artwork. God 
can no more restore the cremated human being to life than he can restore an 
artist's sculpture that was melted or beaten down into a lump. The artwork's 
identity depends upon its causal origins - the intentions and the actions of 
the sculptor that give each piece of clay its shape and position. The artist's 
handiwork individuates the artwork, makes it the artwork it is and numeri-
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cally distinguishes it from other qualitatively identical artworks. What mat-
ters is not just that the parts of the original artwork are where they were once 
before, but how they got there. According to van Inwagen, whether it be a 
freak storm, another man, or even God who destroys the sculpture and then 
reassembles each molecule of clay to where it was before, the original artist 
would be wrong to see this as his original sculpture. He is not responsible for 
this new creation. It is not his artwork, for its matter is not positioned by his 
hand. And likewise, van Inwagen concludes, even God cannot reassemble 
numerically the same human being. Just at the artwork needed to have its 
arrangement of parts caused by the artist, a living human being needs the 
arrangement of his particles to be caused by biological forces. 
If the reader's initial reactions were like my own, she will find van 
Inwagen's account of the persistence conditions of artworks rather convinc-
ing. Nevertheless, it is worth taking a closer look and questioning whether 
van Inwagen did not rather tendentiously choose his examples from the 
world of artifacts. Not all artifacts appear to have persistence conditions 
that rule out" gappy" or intermittent existence, as appears to be the case with 
the before-mentioned sculpture. Some artifacts could not only have been 
put together by others, but "folk ontology" (metaphysical commonsense) 
suggests that they can be disassembled and reassembled. In fact, this cate-
gory of artifacts which can be assembled, disassembled and reassembled 
even includes some artworks. Many modem art constructions and displays 
involve a number of pieces which can be packed up, carted off to another 
museum and reassembled without being the creation of a new artwork. 
Such artworks might be understood as either not existing when disassem-
bled and thus capable of intermittent existence, or as continuing to exist 
throughout the interim period - though as a scattered object. 
Leaving artworks aside for the moment, consider a gun that can be dis-
assembled and put in a carrying case. This is not a new gun that comes into 
existence when it is reassembled. If new guns could so appear, a hired 
killer standing on trial could protest to the judge that the gun the prosecu-
tion has introduced as evidence could not possibly be the murder weapon 
because it had not even been in existence at the time of the killing, since the 
police have recently taken its parts out of the briefcase in which it was dis-
covered and assembled them for display in court. 
Consider also that paradigmatic scattered object - the watch under 
repair. Its numerous pieces can be spread out on a repairman's table. Many 
laymen and philosophers believe the watch continues to exist in such a 
scattered form. It should not be thought that it is because disassembled and 
reassembled watches and guns are taken apart and put back together in 
ways predetermined by the manufacturer that their restoration is success-
ful, while the reassembly of a cremated being is the creation of a duplicate 
rather than the resurrection of the original. My intuition is that the assassin 
intending to conceal his gun in a briefcase can cut up and store the gun in 
ways the manufacturers did not design it to be disassembled. Likewise, the 
repairman does not have to separate the watch at its joints but can break 
off parts that were not the size and shape of the components originally 
assembled. He can break apart the watch any way he pleases so long as he 
can still reassemble the object. 
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Nor do I think that there is a limit on the size to which the parts can be 
reduced and still be considered parts. Admittedly, there is a difference 
between the atoms that compose the gun and large parts such as the bar-
rel and trigger. The atoms aren't noticeable gun parts. They could just as 
well each be a part of something other than a gun, unlike the barrel and 
trigger. Still, if a laser can manipulate a single atom component of a gun 
(and we can imagine that such a procedure is necessary to repair a preci-
sion atomic gun of the future), there is no reason not to consider the atom 
a part of the watch. Furthermore, the atom is a part of the object according 
to standard mereological definitions. And I don't see any reason for 
believing that something can be reassembled only when it has been 
reduced to large parts rather than atomic parts. Many viewers of Star Trek 
don't find it counterintuitive to imagine that a gun can be broken down 
into its elementary particles and beamed to another location and then 
reassembled. But if the beam malfunctions, scattering the atoms across the 
galaxy, and then, just by chance, the same atoms coalesced in the shape of 
the gun years later, it won't be the same gun, or a gun at all. An artifact 
has relational properties essentially. An object must be intentionally made 
in order to be an artifact. But if the parts, no matter how small and scat-
tered, are deliberately reassembled in accordance with the original inten-
tion of its maker, it strikes me as intuitively the same object. This intuition 
can be reinforced if we compare a watch that continues to exist even 
though its parts are scattered across the repairman's table to the qualita-
tively similar parts in the garbage can that do not compose a watch, even 
a scattered one. Because of the craftsman's involvement with the parts of 
the watch, we are disposed to claim the watch still exists. But there is no 
involvement with nor intention to reassemble the parts in the trash. 
However, if the craftsman changed his mind and the parts were retrieved 
from the trash, wouldn't they compose the same watch that they did the 
last time they were assembled? I would think so. The reader who says no 
would be committed to the watch on the repairman'S table permanently 
going out of existence if the craftsman decides not to reassemble the parts. 
(Perhaps there is no market for such watches any longer.) But if the crafts-
man changes his mind (perhaps due to another shift in the market) and 
decides to assemble the parts on his repair table, it seems farfetched to 
claim that they would compose a new watch. 
It is worthwhile to reflect upon the originating causes of artifacts in 
order to determine which are essential to individuating objects. My con-
tention is that while a manufactured object must be the result of someone's 
intention to be an artifact, and (most of) its original matter is essential to it, 
other causal facts and processes responsible for the arrangement of its orig-
inal material are not. If it is not important where the material was or how it 
came together when an artifact first came into existence, perhaps it should 
not be thought relevant to the identity of any object what events preceded 
the assembling of its parts for a second time. That is, if possible variations in 
the causal origins of an object would not affect the identity of the first 
assembled object, why not consider the second assembly of the numerical-
ly identical parts to be a rebuilding of the original artifact rather than the 
creation of a duplicate? By analogy, why not consider the reassembled 
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remains of the cremated human organism to be the resurrection of the orig-
inal individual rather than the creation of a duplicate? 
It would no doubt be helpful to provide a concrete illustration of the 
thesis of the last passage. Consider your purchase of a prefabricated tool-
shed that has never been assembled. Does it matter if your delivery and 
assembly person is Smith rather than Jones? That is, if Smith assembles the 
purchase is it a different tool shed than if Jones had been the first to assem-
ble it? It does not seem plausible that the identity of the assembler deter-
mines which tool shed you bought and own. Moreover, can't you have 
Smith assemble your toolshed on the showroom floor and then have Jones 
disassemble it, pack it up and then reassemble it in your back yard without 
affecting the identity of your purchase? I would think so. Now consider the 
machine gun that you bought to protect your new toolshed from graffiti-
writing vandals. Each part of it was manufactured separately by an assem-
bly line machine. Does it matter if machine A rather than machine B assem-
bled the gun? That is, would it be a different gun if a different machine had 
assembled the very same parts? My intuition is that it would be the very 
same gun. Ask yourself whether you have created a new gLffi that needs to 
be licensed every time you take the gun out of its carrying case, screw its 
barrel, handle, trigger, and telescopic sight together in order to shoot a 
young vandal with a can of spray paint. If you answer yes, your meta-
physics seem to me to be as dubious as your morals. 
Thus van Inwagen's reliance upon our intuitions about artifact identity 
in order to reinforce his claim about the impossibility of our existing again 
after our biological components lose their structure and proximity to each 
other, appears less compelling after we have observed that some artifacts 
can survive as scattered objects when disassembled or can even exist inter-
mittently. Which type of artifact, if any, are human beings more like? Are 
we more similar to the sculptured artworks or the mass produced and vari-
ously assembled artifacts? Perhaps the correct answer is that we are quite 
unlike both. Despite some misgivings about the entire enterprise of compar-
ing artworks and human animals, I want to push the artifact/ artwork/ ani-
mal analogy a little further. Consider human sexual reproduction. It does 
not involve anything like the artist leaving his intentional mark on the prod-
uct. There are millions of sperm heading for an egg and the parents do not 
intend which sperm meets the egg or what combination of genes are 
formed by fertilization. So no artist-like intention is the source of the 
arrangement of the zygote's essential matter. Absent from a human being's 
origin is an artistic concern with the details of creation and the location of 
the incipient human being's parts which characterized the statue. Whether 
the same sperm meets the same egg earlier or later, or which technician car-
ries out the in vitro fertilization of that egg, should not affect our identity. 
This perhaps makes our origins more like those of artifacts that can be 
assembled by anyone at different times without this affecting their identity. 
But even if it is thought that the proper analogy is between the human 
being and the sculpture, rather than the human being and the toolshed or 
the gun, I do not think this will support van Inwagen's thesis. Consider a 
sculpture made in a studio of a master sculptor. The apprentice of the mas-
ter places each piece of clay in a position at the direction of the master. 
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Who is the art work's creator? I tend to think that it is just the master 
unless the apprentice is doing something highly skilled. Even in the latter 
case, my judgement would be that the sculpture is a co-creation rather than 
the artistic creation solely of the apprentice. If the master can create or co-
create an artwork that another assembles, why can he not be rightly con-
sidered the creator or co-creator of a statue that results from others reassem-
bling the clay of his now destroyed statue, if they do so in accordance with 
the intentions that he originally conveyed to his apprentice? Perhaps we 
should see the product of the second assembly as numerically identical to 
the first one completed by the dutiful apprentice. Thus such a sculpture 
could have a II gappy" or scattered existence. 
Why not view God's behavior as analogous to the directions the mas-
ter sculptor gave to the apprentice? God could be understood as the 
"original artist" who created the world and arranged its matter and laws 
so that there would be organisms. Such background assumptions would 
make it plausible to think that God could resurrect people if He were 
faithful to His original blueprint that formed and maintained the human 
beings in question. So just as there are not any metaphysical principles 
that rule out the restoration of a destroyed statue, it appears that none 
render our resurrection impossible. 
However, even if the claims above were to lead van Inwagen to admit 
that his account of artifacts is flawed, he could insist that this just means 
that artifacts are not like human beings in the relevant ways and thus are 
not useful for making any identity claims about the latter. He might main-
tain that his position is not at odds with the story I told about the details 
and the causes of our origins. He can grant the essentiality of the original 
matter and the irrelevance of much of the causal history that culminated 
with our origins. He can then admit that the "when," "where," and "how" 
our matter first came together is metaphysically irrelevant. Van Inwagen 
might insist that whether we came into existence through a sexual act, an 
advanced biotech procedure, or whether God just miraculously merged the 
matter that would otherwise have been so arranged by a natural process of 
fertilization and zygote formation, is all moot, for the only position he is 
committed to is that of the metaphysical importance of our continuity as 
human organisms. His central claim is that an individual's constitutive mat-
ter must remain caught up in a life without interruption and when the vari-
ous particles are eventually replaced it is by ongoing biological processes 
characteristic of every organism. Both the self-maintained structural integri-
ty of the organism and the addition of new matter must be due to biological 
processes involving the metabolizing of food, the assimilation of oxygen, 
the excretion of wastes, the maintenance of homeostasis etc. So what mat-
ters to identity is that a human being's parts are where they are due to the 
continual biological processes of the organism rather than some other cause 
such as God's miraculous tracking and reassembling of matter that has long 
ceased to be caught up in any life processes. 
My contention is that the issue of what manner of resurrection is meta-
physically possible is not unrelated to the possibility that we could have 
originated in a different manner than we actually did. I have been insisting 
that it is not important how our parts come together in their first assembly 
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at the time of our origins, in order to downplay the significance of any 
events preceding a later assembly to object identity. If it does not matter 
whether we are initially a result of a miracle, in vitro fertilization or sexual 
reproduction, why should it matter when the parts are reassembled a sec-
ond time? I am emphasizing that what is essential is that certain matter be 
caught up in a life, rather than how it got there or even whether the life 
continued uninterrupted. 
To weaken the hold that van Inwagen's biological continuity intuition 
might have on you, consider for the sake of argument that someone came 
into existence through fertilization in a petri dish at an infertility clinic at 
T 1. Surely this individual could have come into existence later at T 2 if the 
union of the same sperm and egg had been delayed a little while. So the 
same organism that might have originated at T1 in World 1 has now come 
into existence at T2 in W2' Now imagine in W3 that the same being is 
destroyed an instant after it originates as a zygote and before it had physi-
cally changed at all. The destroyed parts of the zygote are then reassem-
bled at T 2 in W 3 and are physically identical to the parts of the organism 
that they would have composed if that organism had first come into exis-
tence at T 2 in W 2' There is absolutely no quantitative or qualitative physi-
cal difference between the parts of the one celled organism in the different 
worlds. Can it really matter that the organism at T2 in W3 is not the result 
of a continuous biological processes from T I? If it does not seem to matter 
that the organism in WI or W 2 or W 3 comes into existence initially from a 
test tube or normal conception or a miraculous fusion of the matter essen-
tial to the zygote at either T 1 or T 2, can it really matter metaphysically if in 
W 3 the zygote at T 2 consists of the reassembled parts of the zygote at T 1 
rather than possesses those same parts due to biological continuity? There 
are no physical differences in the zygotes separated by the temporal gaps. 
The zygote in W 3 at T 2 is physically identical to how it would have been if 
it had originated then rather than been reassembled at that time. 
It should not be thought that the identity claims in the above passage 
are only plausible because the entity discussed is a one cell organism of the 
type that we all originate from. A similar point could be made with a com-
plex organism rather than a zygote. God could have brought you into exis-
tence just a split second ago complete with "quasi - memories" of having 
lived for decades. God also could have had you originate two days from 
now. Consider the possibility that God destroys you a moment after creat-
ing you and then two days later, at the exact time that God could have 
originally brought you into existence, He reassembles your parts exactly as 
they were at the time he destroyed you. I find it difficult to believe that this 
is a duplicate rather than you, especially when we have already established 
you could have been brought into existence in that condition and at that 
moment for the first time. Can it really matter if at that later time the 
assembled entity is not biologically continuous with you from your origin? 
There would have been no physical change between the two beings 
because you were destroyed an instant after being created. 
I have probably pushed the readers as far as they will go on the previ-
ous issue. So let us tum now to a second argument that van Inwagen offers 
to show that the manner in which an individual's parts are united in the 
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future determines whether that individual continues to exist or if a dupli-
cate has replaced him. Van Inwagen maintains that the reassembly of the 
matter that once composed an individual is not sufficient for his resurrec-
tion. To show this, van Inwagen makes use of a thought experiment in 
which all the matter that composed him when he was ten years old is 
reassembled across the room from him. Which individual is van Inwagen? 
It seems obvious that van Inwagen would not be the youthful-looking per-
son who just appeared, even though, years ago, van Inwagen was com-
posed of the numerically same atoms. But van Inwagen insists that those 
who claim resurrection just involves the reassembly of an individual's 
atoms, have no grounds upon which to reject the claim of the youngster 
that he is Peter van Inwagen. 
Van Inwagen overlooks alternative explanations available to the believ-
ers in the reassembly model of resurrection. One reason that many people 
might not think that Peter van Inwagen would be the individual with the 
childish appearance is that van Inwagen already exists. Already existing, 
his identity cannot be threatened by what happens elsewhere. But this 
response could not be made to another thought experiment that van 
Inwagen puts forth in a later article. Van Inwagen imagines that a thou-
sand years from now, God could reassemble the atoms that composed him 
when he was twenty and could also reassemble the atoms that composed 
him at his death decades later, say when he was eighty. Van lnwagen asks: 
II And which will be I? Neither or both, it would seem, and, since not both, 
neither." But van Inwagen's thought experiments do not support the con-
clusion that resurrection through reassembly is impossible. Most of us who 
believe that we can cease to exist and then reappear, insist that the 
reassembly must be of the parts we had at the time of our destruction. To 
come back as a robust twenty year old when one died as a frail eighty year 
old is to deny sixty years of one's existence. One's life had continued 
throughout those years. That is why in either of the two thought experi-
ments, the presence of the individual with the youthful appearance does 
not make it difficult for us to identify van Inwagen. Even though the being 
with the youthful appearance is composed of the original atoms that con-
stituted the older man years earlier, he is not identical to the latter. 
The reader should not think that this principle that one can exist again 
only if one returns as one last existed is ad hoc. The same principle governs 
the intermittent existence of other entities. A baseball game suspended in 
the sixth inning due to rain or darkness cannot resume the next day in the 
second inning. But just as the game can resume in the sixth inning, my 
intuition is that a person who died when he was eighty could exist again if 
the parts he had at the last time of his existence were reassembled. The 
same point holds in other cases of intermittent existence such as trials, 
classes, and theatrical plays. A trial can be suspended but it must resume 
where it left off or it would be a new trial. For instance, if all the previous 
oaths, testimony, motions, evidence, depositions etc. were not considered 
part of the trial when the court was next in order, it won't be the same trial. 
A similar point can be made of a class that is suspended due to a school 
shooting, teachers' strike or natural disaster. The same class can resume 
only if the assignments and tests previously completed are counted 
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towards the class's requirements. If they were not, we wouldn't describe 
the class as being numerically the same as the one interrupted. Readers 
who would identify the classes even if the earlier work was not accepted 
may be guilty of a type-token fallacy. 
An analogy with artifacts can again be used to weaken van Inwagen's 
claims. Even if all of a car's parts that had been replaced over a period of 
twenty years were of sufficient number to compose a car when they were 
reassembled, one would not think that the latter would be the same car 
that had left the factory assembly line twenty years earlier. And this is true 
even if the twenty year old car was disassembled and undergoing repairs 
in a service garage at the time that its discarded parts from the previous 
twenty years were reassembled. (Like the gun and the toolshed mentioned 
earlier, the car can be disassembled and reassembled.) So there is plenty of 
evidence that it is an entity's most recent parts and their position relative to 
each other that matter to its continued existence. These parts need not be 
immanent causes of the entity at a later stage, for the entity can be disas-
sembled and reassembled. Nevertheless, the parts an entity had at its most 
recent moment of existence are necessary for it to exist later, just as the 
parts that an entity had at its actual origin, would, of necessity, have to be 
its constituent matter if that entity were to have come into existence at a 
different time. 
If God reassembles a cremated individual, the parts of the resulting 
individual are not where they are merely because of biological processes. 
But that doesn't mean the individual's atoms are where they are solely 
because of God's miracle. God has miraculously placed them where they 
are in relation to each other because of the relative position the biological 
processes last bestowed upon them. The biological processes thus have a 
causal role, it is just not one of immanent causation. If God chooses to res-
urrect an organism, that last material arrangement of the biological 
processes determines the location of the divinely reassembled parts. 
Part II 
Whether the reader agrees with what I have said so far, or accepts van 
Inwagen's "Body Snatching" account, she still probably wants to know 
why it is that someone is not stuck after resurrection with the frail eighty 
year old form she had at her death? And what keeps her from immediately 
dying again of the same disease or injury? Undoubtably, God could 
remove the lethal threat in the blink of an eye, but wouldn't she still be frail 
and old? I can't make another appeal to God's power to instantaneously 
restore a woman to her youth since I claimed earlier that God could not 
bring any of us back into existence as robust twenty year olds if we die at 
eighty. My response is to begin with noting the obvious: that we can delay 
aging without feeling we are violating any metaphysical truths. No one 
thinks that when people take vitamins containing antioxidants they have 
done something to threaten their identity and survival. Since some people 
age more slowly than others, could the aging process of the latter naturally 
speed up or the former slow down? I do not see why not and since at all 
ages we are replacing old cells with new ones, why could not the new skin 
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cells of an eighty year old resemble those that replaced the earlier dead 
cells when she was in her twenties? It is not much of a step from admitting 
this is metaphysically legitimate to allowing the reversal of the aging 
process. As long as restoration of a youthful form does not happen too 
quickly and the replacement parts are not too large, the result should be 
metaphysically and biologically acceptable. 
But why, the reader might ask, does the speed or size of the part 
replacement matter? The key lies in the concept of "assimilation." 
Assimilation has to do with how an entity integrates new parts with its old. 
Not any kind of part replacement will preserve the existence of the entity 
in question. Our attitude about part replacement is determined by what is 
the norm for the type of entity in question. That our familiarity with this 
norm makes us doubt that a person could survive any process that 
diverges greatly in speed or size of part replacement is no reason for suspi-
cion if such an attitude reflects biological fact about what it is to be a part of 
an organism. Consider the replacement of a human being's parts. Human 
organisms naturally replace all of their matter slowly over a period of time. 
If we imagine thought experiments where our parts are changed in differ-
ent sizes and at different speeds, our intuitions about our survival are cor-
related with how closely the thought experiments parallel normal, natural 
biological replacement. If a person's parts are replaced in two steps, first by 
an exact duplicate of his entire left side from his brain to his toes, and then 
by an exact duplicate of his right side, our attitude would be that he did 
not survive but had been replaced by a duplicate, who thought he was the 
original person in question. So size matters. 
Speed also matters. If I were informed that all my parts were shortly to 
be replaced in succession in a process taking only a matter of seconds, I 
would believe that a duplicate would soon take my place. I believe that it is 
the lack of assimilation that precludes surviving speedy part replacement. 
The importance of assimilation can be seen in cases in which it is lacking. 
Consider replacing the parts of a child that has been cryogenically frozen. 
Could the child survive all of its parts being replaced in a split second? I 
doubt it. Because the low temperatures have suspended all life processes, 
the portions of new matter are never caught up in the child's physiology. 
The result is that the original child has been replaced by a duplicate. That 
one could not survive speedy part replacement because of the lack of 
assimilation is even more evident if we imagine a person being teletrans-
portated. Most people, though not van Inwagen, probably believe they 
could survive teletransportation from Earth to Mars if their original Earth 
atoms were reassembled on Mars. But we are less likely to believe that we 
would survive if all of our deconstructed parts were, while on route to 
Mars, removed one by one from the teletransportation beam and replaced 
sequentially with small, qualitatively identical but numerically distinct 
parts, and these new parts were reassembled on Mars when the beam 
arrived there. This lack of survival is even clearer if the being that ends up 
materializing on the teletransportation platform on Mars has a qualitative-
ly very different brain, body and psychology from that of the person 
whose parts were the original ones in the beam. But the same qualitative 
changes in body, brain and personality that result from part replacement 
34 Faith and Philosophy 
wouldn't threaten the reader's identity if they were to occur slowly outside 
the beam in the normal course of life. Such changes would roughly parallel 
the ordinary physiological and psychological growth and changes of any 
person from youth to old age. 
Why do we have this intuition that we could not survive even qualita-
tively identical part replacement in the teletransportation beam, but could 
survive even greater qualitative and quantitative changes outside of the 
beam over a longer period? The answer is that the new parts inserted into 
the beam containing us in scattered form were not assimilated into our 
body, gradually becoming caught up in the same life functions and psy-
chology. Standardly, the new parts of one's body and mind only become 
parts of the old body and mind when they become involved and integrated 
into the same biology and psychology. A JJforeign body" is something that 
does not become caught up in the life process of an organism. No potential 
body part can be biologically assimilated by a body while the latter is scat-
tered in a teletransportation beam. 
The last problem I want to consider is whether resurrection is possible if 
one's parts were posthumously assimilated into another human being. The 
concern motivating this is that if some of one's parts at the time of one's 
death were later assimilated into another human organism, remaining 
there until death, then both can be resurrected with the same parts only as 
Siamese Twins, sharing perhaps a limb that we had both possessed. 
Coming back as Siamese twins, seems more in line with a spoof of this 
debate rather than a solution to it. 
We clearly do not need all of our original parts. We can lose legs, add 
prosthetics and still exist. Of course, God does not have to resurrect us with 
prosthetics - He can make new limbs for us. But a problem occurs if too 
much of one's vital matter becomes part of the vital matter of another per-
son. Both of us could not survive without that particular chunk of matter, so 
substituting two new chunks of matter for it, as was done in the case of the 
shared limb, would result not in our resurrections but in our duplications. 
However, we do not have to fall back on van Inwagen's body-snatching 
simulacra-making divinity to avoid this. The answer is just that we cannot 
all be resurrected at the same time. However, God could speed up our part 
replacement to the maximum point where any faster matter exchange 
would result in duplication rather than resurrection with newly assimilated 
matter. So after the one first resurrected assimilates new matter and releases 
the old, the "old matter" could be used in the resurrection of the other 
being. We eventually could both coexist, and could do so for eternity. This 
staggered version of resurrection surely seems a preferable solution to hav-
ing God leave us believing we are burying what is really but an illusion. 
Conclusion 
So it appears that the changes of matter necessary for a healthy resurrec-
tion are not of a size or speed that would cause us to doubt whether the liv-
ing being is the same individual who existed before at death's door. The 
fact that the individual's life would involve gaps may be no more problem-
atic than the disassembly and reassembly, or even the destruction and 
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restoration, of artifacts and artworks. Since the artist can create or co-create 
a work of art by giving instructions to others who use their own hands to 
arrange the matter of the artist's creation, there doesn't seem to be any 
good reason for rejecting the claim that the reassembly of such an object's 
parts, when done in accordance with the original artist's intentions, brings 
about the existence again of the original artwork. So van Inwagen's analo-
gy to our own destruction and resurrection cannot receive any support 
from the realm of artworks and artifacts. And if we are God's creations, the 
result of biological processes that He put in motion, then we too should be 
able to exist again when our parts are reassembled in very much the same 
manner that they were at the time of our destruction. And we have seen 
that this position can be reinforced by the possibility that we could have 
corne into existence with the very same matter at different times. This 
makes it plausible to maintain that we could have been destroyed a 
moment after our actual origins and then brought back into existence with 
the very same matter and at the very same time that it was possible for us 
to first have originated. And such an event could be accurately described 
as a type of resurrection. 
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NOTES 
1. My aim in this essay is to investigate the possibility of an afterlife for 
soulless material beings. I am not denying that there exist immaterial beings 
(e.g. God, Angels), I just doubt that we belong to this category. Unfortunately, 
to defend the claim that we lack immaterial souls would result in too much of a 
digression. All that I can say here is that what we know about the neurological 
dependence of thought provides us with reason to doubt that we possess an 
immaterial mind/soul. For an elaboration see Peter van Inwagen's Metaphysics 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1993) pp. 178-180 and also Paul Churchland's 
Consciousness and Matter. (Cambridge: Bradford Books, 1990) pp. 18-21. 
2. Van Inwagen, Peter. "The Possibility of Resurrection." International 
Journal of Philosophy of Religion. Op. cit. p. 121. 
3. The "Body-Snatching" description of van Inwagen's account is a phrase 
taken from Dean Zimmerman's article on the same question. See his 
"Materialism and Survival" in Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions ed. 
Stump, E. and Murray, M. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999) pp. 379-386. In a postscript 
added in 1997, van Inwagen acknowledges there could be other ways in which 
God accomplishes resurrection of the dead that "I am unable to even form the 
idea of because I lack the conceptual resources to do so." The Possibility of 
Resurrection and other Essays in Christian Apologetics. (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1997) p. 50. 
4. Van Inwagen writes: "The atoms of which I am composed occupy at 
each instant the positions they do because of the operations of certain processes 
within me (those processes that taken collectively, constitute my being alive.) 
Even when I become a corpse, provided I decay slowly and am not say cremat-
ed. - the atoms that will compose me occupy the positions relative to one that 
they do occupy largely because of the processes that used to go on within me: 
or this will be the case at least for a short period. Thus a former corpse in which 
the processes of life have been "started up again" may well be the very man 
who was once before alive, provided the processes of dissolution did not 
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progress too far while he was a corpse. But if a man does not simply die but is 
totally destroyed (as in the case of cremation) then he can never be reconstitut-
ed, for the causal chain has been irrevocably broken. Thus if God collects the 
atoms that used to constitute the man and 'reassembles' them, they will occupy 
the positions relative to one another because of God's miracle and not because 
of the operation of the natural processes that, taken collectively, were the life of 
the man." "The Possibility of Resurrection." International Journal of Philosophy of 
Religion~ Vol. IX No.2 1978. pp. 119. 
5. Van Inwagen's actual examples are of an ancient manuscript penned by 
St. Augustine that is burned and the parts miraculously reassembled by God 
and a modem child's house of blocks construction that is knocked down and 
then reassembled by the parent. Since I am interested in the resurrection of a 
human being it is useful to contrast this with the reassembly of a statue of a 
human being. Furthermore, the statue example in a sense combines traits of 
both of van Inwagen's examples of a famous creation made by the hand of a 
historical figure and the "lumpy" construction as involved in the blocks. I 
don't think any harm is done by the switch. 
6. Bill Forgie has pointed out to me that matters are complicated if the 
parts are scattered and used in other artifacts. Can they ever be reassembled 
into the earlier artifacts that they were part of? I will address this near the end 
of the paper, since we are really interested in the resurrection of human beings. 
7. William Hasker's questions provoked the discussion in this passage. 
8. See Saul Kripke's Naming and Necessity. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1972) pp. 113-116. 
9. It may be thought that genetic engineering of children in the future will 
make their creation more like that of an artwork for particular genes will be 
placed in specific chromosomal areas just as particular pieces of clay are placed 
by the sculptor in specific locations. 
10. Or consider a print. Isn't the creator the artist and not the person who 
runs off the prints? 
11. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer who urged me to take up this 
second argument of van Inwagen's. 
12. Van Inwagen. "The Possibility of Resurrection." Op. cit. p. 120. 
13. Van lnwagen. "Dualism and Materialism: Athens and Jerusalem? Faith 
and Philosophy. vol. 12 No.4. October 1995. 
14. IBID. p. 486. 
15. This stress on the last material arrangement frees my account from the 
critique that defenders of immanent causation direct against those who think 
that identity over time just amounts to spatial-temporal continuity. This leaves 
them without grounds to deny the identity of a being that is destroyed with 
the duplicate that replaces it if this all occurs without any spatio-temporal gap. 
For discussion and references see Dean Zimmerman's "Immanent Causation." 
Philosophical Perspectives. 11,1997. p. 435. 
16. By "reversal" I do not mean regression to infancy. 
17. See Peter Unger's Consciousness, Identity and Value. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990.) pp. 147-156 for an informative account of part replace-
ment and assimilation. I am quite indebted to Unger on this matter. 
18. I would like to thank Bill Forgie, Nathan Salmon, Saul Hershenov, 
William Hasker and a pair of anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on 
this paper. 
